In: Research in Phenomenology , 1977, Vol. 7, HEIDEGGER MEMORIAL ISSUE (1977), pp. 12-30.
Wonderful article by one of the greatest Heidegger-scholars, by Werner Marx. It is an attempt to think with Heidegger, along Heidegger, and address questions about the “Sache des Denkens” (the matter or issue of thinking), indicating that “thought” is of non-subjective nature; that it is something that ought to be addressed and addresses us;
For this purpose, W. Marx presents to us, in his own interpretation, Heidegger’s “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thought”, which is, as far as I know, from 1941 (published in GA 14).
The challenging question for us and for W. Marx is: “is it necessary for thinking to have passed beyond metaphysics to think through the tradition and history of metaphysics, reflecting, for instance, on the end of philosophy?”
W. Marx sees indication that Heidegger’s philosophy has indeed passed beyond metaphysics in Heidegger’s attempt to think “man’s involvement in the “nothing” as the ontological meaning of Dasein; or simpler: as the self-encounter of Dasein in its facticity and finitude.” (17)
“It was with this insight into man’s own impotence that Heidegger actually passed beyond metaphysics. With it the stage was set for the ‘turning’ (Kehre) which his thought underwent, such that thereafter the power of nothingness was thought to reside in the manifestation of the Being of beings.” (17)
W. Marx takes this to be the quintessence of the turning, namely that the matter of thought is not the result of acts performed by human thinking, but, in a way, always beyond, or underneath, or within thinking.
Heidegger’s contribution in this regard is said to be his conception of truth as aletheia (20): the phenomenon of an open sphere of reference, an open realm, without which no object can come to stand over against our faculty of representation which is open to it–of an open realm, which is not produced by the faculty of representation itself, the latter rather adopting or presupposing the former.” (20)
“truth” as evidence, certainty, correctness of propositions all presuppose this openness (20).
W. Marx continues by showing that this “openness” is considered as both clearing and concealment (21). This form of concealment, which is not man-made, nor due to an error or fallacy of the side of man, is still inherent in letting particular beings be. – the dimension of what is concealed is, as W. Marx points out, “perpetually closed off to man” (21).
It is then the vocation of man to remain “cognisant of such concealment to guard this mystery” (21) – but nonetheless, man continually turns away from it; forgetting the mystery and “erring” (Irre) is constitutive of Dasein (21).
It is also helpful that W. Marx points to the “origin” of the conception of full intelligibility in Aristotle’s philosophy, where intelligibility is bound to the concept of “nous” or the self-thinking mind (nous noeseos). “Full illumination” through nous became, within the philosophy of modernity, the idea that the source of this light is God; but in its secularized form, it is believed that the source of this light is the rationality of the scientific and technical human subject (22).
“A whole contingent of sciences, from cybernetics to communications theory, social and biotechnology, stand today ready to serve in controlling a completely rational society.” (22)
One could add that the very idea of “rationality” has changed within this historical process, namely that the rationality of “nous” is totally different than the “rationality” of a scientific and technological society.
For Heidegger, and W. Marx emphasizes the importance of this thought, everything that occurs within the clearing is “permeated” by concealment, by darkness, so to speak. (22)
This concealment, however, is complemented by a “concealment” within the sphere of particular beings, the concealment of disguise (Verstellen), or the capacity of beings to deceive us, … (23)
Up to this point, W. Marx gives an excellent summary and description of Heidegger’s philosophy. Only later, on p. 28, he raises a question and a concern: “Heidegger ventured forth into a realm not yet entered by philosophy. By going back further than metaphysics he won for himself the freedom to pre-think the basic traits of a new meaning of being. Granted that this can be considered a legimitate task, the doubt arises: does not such an attempt transcend the limits of philosophy, the very range of human thought itself? What is more: is it possible to give an account of such thought in a fashion that admits of inter-subjective validity and verifiability?” (28)
It seems to me that the second question manifests the “real issue” for W. Marx. But isn’t he also talking from within the framework of metaphysics when he is asking for intersubjective validity and verifiability? Well, that would be too easy. We cannot simply disqualify the questioner in this way, since W. Marx did not specifically ask for “objectivity” and also did not specify what kind of verification he had in mind. With other words, there could be a form of intersubjective validity and verifiability that fits/suits the “matter of this kind of thought,” namely what Heidegger says and writes about the Ereignis, about physis, logos, and aletheia, could be intersubjectively true but not by virtue of fixating either subjects nor objects (subjectivity / substance) by any kind of metaphysic properties but by “creating” or “forming” the companionship of those who can talk about these matters. Heidegger might be “the first” (which is not necessary at all and probably not true) but by no means he has to be the only one venturing into this realm of “non-metaphysical truth.”
The same is true for W. Marx’s question about the verifiability of “Heidegger’s truths”: verification can have different forms, and perhaps the form that is adequate for verifying the truth of written or spoken words about the Ereignis is closely connected to how Heidegger describes the necessity of “individuation” and “authenticity;” perhaps, as the later Heidegger would emphasize, “authenticity” as being called-forth and needed by the Ereignis; appropriated by it. W. Marx himself wrote that the task of thinking, according to Heidegger, is a form of letting oneself be addressed by the issue at hand (die Sache des Denkens). Verification, thus, does not work purely from within the subject, the framework for this verification is not human subjectivity; but the “Gegnet” of the Ereignis; a dynamic event of appropriation in which the thing and Dasein approach each other.
In the final remarks, W. Marx seems to draw attention to the necessity to make explicate Heidegger’s “non-metaphysical ethics,” something he then develops on his own in his famous book “Gibt es auf Erden ein Maß?”.
A wonderful paper; and a wonderful “memory” (commemoration) of Heidegger’s life and thought!