Let’s read: Vincent Blok, “Ecological Hermeneutic Phenomenology”

A Method to Explore the Ontic and Ontological Structures of Technologies in the World, published in: Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Technology, De Boer, B., Zwier, J. (Eds.), Openbook Publishers 2024.

I stumbled upon this article by Vincent Blok. Blok’s social media are very distinct and hard to overlook, since he is the only academic (as far as I know) who uses annoyingly many hashtags in all of his posts. As if he was a vlogger from the early 2000’s. Blok was asking for constructive criticism. I am very interested in this topic and read a few pages; and now decided to write a post about it. So let’s go! Here’s the abstract!

1. Introduction

From the beginning of the article (book chapter), we can see that the operative distinction that Blok frequently falls back to is that between “ontic phenomena” and “underlying ontological structures.” He contends that approaches, other than his own, focused on only one of these poles (and therefore, are one-sided); while the obvious solution would be a middle way. Apparently, Blok wrote books and articles on this topic and critically engaged with Don Ihde on these matters.

At a first glance, Blok’s distinction seems to be misleading, but misleading in a convincing way that uses trendy keywords like “essentialism” and “determinism” to reject Heidegger’s and Ellul’s views. I’ve noticed that people in the anglo-saxon world particularly love this new keyword “essentialism” and frequently use it to describe Heidegger’s ontology. Blok will perhaps elaborate what he means by it, but he would not be the first philosopher who uses it without any explanation as if it were decided that ontology equals essentialism.

More continental phenomenologists and people who work on Heidegger would not describe his philosophy as “essentialism.” It is a weird and wrong way to characterize his philosophy. One that reiterates a metaphysical position about essences/accidens to describe a philosophy that deeply criticizes it. In short, even when Heidegger writes about the “essence of technology,” this concept “essence” is used in the way Heidegger talks about essences and not – big surprise – in the way other philosophers used this word – nor in the way that critics claim that people have used that word. “Strawmanning” is a big problem in these debates. It goes hand in hand with branding philosophies and philosophers in a certain way. X is essentialism, Y is determinism, Z is transcendental phenomenology, etc.

So, let’s just keep in mind that Heidegger’s philosophy is neither essentialism nor determinism and also that the distinction Blok frequently employs between “ontic phenomena” and “underlying ontological structures” is not as clear as he wants us to believe it is. Namely, the underlying structures are not “essences” that are in any way separated from the phenomena. There is no being (Seiendes) without Being (Sein); or, the other way around: Being (Sein) is what makes beings (Seiendes, plural) what they are.

But let us continue with Blok’s article.

Or maybe not. Let us dwell on this a little bit longer.

This is still the introduction of Blok’s article. But red warning lights are already going off at almost every sentence. If these are the premises, the setting, so to speak, then what can we expect for the following sections?

Apparently, Blok doesn’t like Ihde’s position very much. I did not read his critique in his other articles yet. But it seems to come down to the argument that Ihde is overemphasizing “the concrete phenomena” and hence cannot explain how the ontological and the ontic are intertwined. Seemingly, the two “domains” cannot be reduced to each other; and also, there seems to be a “qualitative difference” between the two levels.

The situation seems to be very clear: There are those who are overly fixated on descriptions of ontic phenomena – they’re clearly wrong because they do not pay attention to the ontological level; and then there are those who are fixated on essences and ontological structures, and naturally they become blind for concrete ontic phenomena. It is as if the solution is served to us on a silver platter: “Wait a second! If both positions are one-sided, how about we combine them?! We suggest a middle-way! And only take the best from both positions! Haha, easy! Problem solved!”

Blok writes: “phenomenology of technology till now cannot claim to do justice to the full phenomenon of phenomenology yet.” — wow. Harter Tobak. “Till now” obviously means “now that Blok arrived and solves all problems.”

2. What Is the Phenomenon of Phenomenology?

Section 2 starts with “short introduction” into Phenomenology. Husserl first, then Heidegger. Now, we do not quite know why Blok needs Husserl; but apparently later in his paper he wants to use the concept of “reduction” and transform it into “transduction,” and also he has an interest in branding his own position as “phenomenology,” hence he must show the link between himself and Husserl and Heidegger.

Now, we could say a lot of things about how Blok’s description of Husserl’s phenomenology is a simplification and at times wrong, but I do not think it is important. (Because I don’t think this article has anything to do with Husserl.)

Let’s at least quote some sentences that are wrong or that are misleading:

1. starting point: what we directly experience, “without committing to any claim about the factuality of what we experience.”
2. “phenomenology does not research the ‘reality’ of what we experience but focuses on the way these experiences of the world are given in …”
3. “Heidegger is critical of H’s phen, because pure consciousness presupposes that we have a position in front of the phenomena that can subsequently become accessible via perception…”
4. “In other words, H’s phen. reduces the relationality of the way the world is given to us and our understanding of the world to one of the relata, namely the transc. subjectivity of pure consciousness…”
5. “Heidegger rejects H’s transcendental phenomenology”

Ad 1 and 2: Let’s just say that phenomenology is actually about reality, about real things – in their respective modes of givenness. Its the commitment to metaphysical theses about what is real that are bracketed.

Ad 3 and 4: Also, this is a misrepresentation of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl; and a misrepresentation of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl does not reduce the relationality to one relata; and Heidegger knows that and therefore does not criticize Husserl for something he does not do.

Ad 5: Lastly, Heidegger does not reject Husserl’s transc. phenomenology.

But again, I have the feeling that these paragraphs are not written for the sake of actually giving an adequate explanation of Husserl’s phenomenology. Rather, Blok seems to do some “branding” here, “namedropping” at best.

The next in line is Heidegger – Blok goes on to describe Heidegger’s philosophy; and it is no big surprise that this description is also a misrepresentation.

Here, for example: “Heidegger’s phen. is not taking beings as point of departure, but Being”, as a prove of this claim, Blok quotes Heidegger saying that in Being and Time he will ask about “Being as such”, … but, wait a second, one could still ask about “Being as such” by starting with beings… these two things are not connected at all. – Blok is mispresenting Heidegger here. Even the late Heidegger who tries to think about “Beyng” without starting at the standpoint of Dasein’s transcendentality, nevertheless is concerned with beings.

All Heidegger-scholars and even people who are slightly interested in Heidegger and have read a few pages of Being and Time might roll their eyes when they read Blok’s sentence:

“In this regard, even if Heidegger speaks about the content
sense in his early concept of phenomenology, he is not so much interested
in the ontic phenomena—the content of my experience of the desk I am
writing at—but primarily in the ontology of the desk that is primarily
constituted in the relational and enactment sense.”

That’s such a weird comment. So wrong in so many regards. Just the distinction (again) between ontic phenomena and ontology is wrong. Of course even an “ontology of the desk” (perhaps he means an ontology of the ready-to-hand?) and an analysis of the constitution of the Being of the desk in the different senses is primarily concerned with the desk itself. What is constituted is exactly the Being of the particular being. Heidegger never talks about a constitution of an “essence” of a thing that is floating around somewhere, lacking a relation to the thing. —

Really, Blok is misunderstanding and misrepresenting the very basics of Heidegger’s philosophy. That’s such a weak strawman-argument… not even my students would claim such things about Heidegger. If Blok means “content of my experience of the desk I am writing at” in the sense of the very specific particularities, such as “the desk is brown, 2m wide, 100kg heavy,” … yes well, no philosopher is really interested in those things. But philosophers are interested in things such as what is the Being of the ready-to-hand? what changes if we view the ready-to-hand as a scientific object? — these considerations can potentially inform our relation to the particular desk that I am sitting at. They are not abstract reflections on a isolated and freefloating essence of the “table as such,” that has no relevance whatsoever to my particular experience. Again, Blok’s is strawmanning, presenting Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophy in the weakest way possible.

The next paragraph (pp. 32-33) is also full of misrepresentations, but I wonder at this point how fast I can get through this article if I point out and comment on every mistake…

Well, just briefly… Blok claims that his interpretation is confirmed in Being and Time (it is not),… then talks about Heidegger’s understanding of the phenomenological method, and contends that phenomenology involves a shift from the relata (beings) to the relationality of our living and acting in the World (Being)… also a weird misrepresentation that I haven’t seen anywhere in years and years of reading phenomenology and about phenomenology. Phenomenology is exactly about the relata in their modes of givenness, that is: about relata and about relationality.

Another misrepresentation concerns the meaning of “destruction” in Heidegger’s philosophy. Blok says: “destruction of these dominant meanings of the philosophical concepts in light of their original meaning (theorein, hyle, eidos, and so on) …” Blok could read Heidegger’s comments on the destruction in GA 82 to learn that destruction is not meant as a method to uncover an original meaning as if there is a wrong meaning of concepts that covers up a correct meaning (the ancient Greek understanding of concepts is the correct one?). But here I might be a bit too pedantic.

The next point is Blok’s interpretation of the “linguistic orientation of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology” (p. 34ff). Blok says “it is clear” that Heidegger’s approach is not good enough: “if we want phenomenology to take the ontic and ontological strucutre of new and disruptive technologies into account, we have to move beyond the linguistic focus of hermeneutics and engage in an ecological hermeneutics of material – ontic – phenomena.” I do not know yet how that is clear and what seems to be the problem with the linguistic approach; but it seems like Blok thinks that “linguistic approach” also implies some kind of “essentialism” since language is “not a being but rather a relational phenomenon” (34) — I’m not sure if that is Blok’s argument here. And also, Blok himself does not come back to this point, – it just doesn’t seem to be important, but perhaps was just meant as checking the box of “let’s be critical of Heidegger.” Let’s continue reading!

Now, Ihde is next, while Blok is trying to clarify what “ecological hermeneutics” means. Blok is repeating that hermeneutics shouldn’t be only about ontic phenomena (their meaning) but also about the meaning of the World in which they appear (34-35). Well, yes… hermeneutics has been like that from the beginning (since Schleiermacher, Schlegel, …) But Blok also says something new: His ecological hermeneutics is also interested “in the materiality of beings as they withdraw from human experience (Earth)”; in section 5 we’ll learn more about that. We have to be patient. — up to this point the whole issue of the article is the strawmanning and misunderstanding of phenomenology and hermeneutics. Especially for Heidegger, in all of Heidegger, whatever you read, you will discover that Heidegger is always concerned with the particular relationship between Being and beings. It is never only the one. Even the later Heidegger, who really tries to pinpoint what Beyng means, Beyng that is not transcendentally constituted, – does so with a concern about the “Wesen des Menschen.” (see Heidegger, Humanismusbrief).

3. Phenomenology as Method

Blok’s main selling strategy for his several research projects (#hashtag) is the claim that he provides a new method… one that can be applied to do actual research.

So, first of all Blok repeats: his solution is to find a “middle ground” between all these one-sided simple-minded approaches… (35, (he does not say simple-minded but if these approaches were indeed Husserl’s or Heidegger’s viewpoints, they would be quite simple-minded. haha. this happens when strawmanning someone’s position, where you present their arguments in the weakest manner possible.).

In the subsequent paragraphs, Blok is discussing Heidegger’s simplified explanations of what the Being of a thing is in his Zollikon Seminars. Blok really likes Heidegger’s use of the Latin term “acceptio” that he translates as “accepting the existing table” (36); and “ontological phenomena” are “accepted by human existence” (37). Sidenote: it is a little bit strange to consult the Zollikon Seminars for an adequate account of Heidegger’s position, and both suppositio and acceptio are used from within a certain tradition of philosophy; Blok’s interpretation of “acceptio” as “accepting the existence” of something, is a simplification on top of a simplification.

But Blok needs these simplifications in order to introduce his method: “a method that is open for the acceptio [of ontological phenomena]” (37); another sidenote: how come that Blok suddenly talks about ontological phenomena? Prior to this, phenomena were ontic; and “ontological” was used to describe the underlying structures as some kind of essences… He does not really explain this new term.

Blok’s interpretation is so strange to me. Is this really Heidegger? For instance, “by engaging in the phenomenology of the acceptio in each and every scientific supposition, we develop a knowing relation without being absorbed by its suppositions” (37) — that’s it? that’s how easy it is?! we just have to accept the existence of something – this is the real meaning of the phenomenological method à la Blok.

Next paragraph (38): “Heidegger starts with an ontic phenomenon like an apple” … What?! I thought Heidegger only ever starts with the Being of something!

Well, let’s continue: Then we ask about the presuppositions and “ask what is accepted in this supposition about the apple” (38) – we’re moving from the suppositio to the acceptio, which is not “a product of abstraction and generalization”. Also, there is no “thematic perception that corresponds with the existence of the apple”; which makes it difficult. Blok asks: “How should we proceed if we want to articulate the acceptio of existence in a phenomenological way?” (38)

Blok leads us back to Husserl for an answer and discusses “generalization” and “formalization”( 38ff.). Maybe this can help? Generalization cannot help, Blok says. Neither can the formalization (40). Sidenote: why did Blok discuss these two then? Blok goes on: “How should we proceed … if we cannot rely on generalization and formalization?”

“In order to get access to the acceptio of space [or Being?!] in the perception of the apple, phenomenolgoy should not generalize or formalize … but on the contrary, adhere to the thematically perceived – and thematize the acceptio in each and every thematic perception” (40). That makes sense. Just adhere to the thing you’re talking about, and just thematize its existence.

Blok gives another example to clarify what he means by that:

“Heidegger provides the example of a cup in space” (What?! I thought Heidegger starts with the Being of something. How come he talks about a cup?!) Blok says that “Access to the acceptio of space is provided by phenomenologically reversing the thematic order: we let the thematic content – the cup in space – become nonthematic, and the nonthematic- the spatiality of the cup – thematic.” That’s genius! Just reverse it! If you want to talk about “Being,” just make it thematic! Just a great solution.

But wait, Blok warns that we have to be critical of Heidegger’s approach. Because only by being critical we can overcome Heidegger and get to the golden middle way and the genius solutions of Blok. Let’s see:

“Although Heidegger’s phenomenology clearly starts with ontic phenomena” (aha, really?)… “he focuses on the relational sense of the phenomenon” (Blok does not explain or elaborate here, instead he only refers back to section 2, where he seemingly already proved and explained everything (he did not).) Let’s read the whole paragraph (41):

“His phenomenological analysis reveals for instance that the apple that
changes its location in a law-governed fashion accepts homogeneous
space and raises critical questions about the acceptio because I am not in
space like the apple that changes its location. In this effort, his method
of phenomenology neglects the content sense in his analysis. On the one
hand, this is understandable, as the focus on the content sense runs the
risk of neglecting the relational and enactment sense, and Heidegger
blames the theoretical attitude of Husserl’s method of phenomenology
for solely concentrating on the content sense (Heidegger, 2010, p. 63).
On the other hand, Heidegger’s focus on the relational and enactment
sense of the acceptio runs the opposite risk of neglecting the content
sense of the phenomena, as we will see show in the remainder of this
section.”

So many non-sequiturs, so many misinterpretations. This is really difficult to unravel.

What does Blok mean? He says that Heidegger starts with the ontic phenomenon, but then “neglects the content sense in his analysis” (41). But: why? how? when? This is just stated by Blok without any proof, without any arguments. Blok is this time almost right when describing Heidegger’s critique of Husserl. Yes, Heidegger criticizes Husserl for “solely” concentrating on the content sense; but only because this means that by not paying attention to how the what is constituted, the content sense can be predetermined theoretically, without us noticing this predetermination. — but the point here is “solely”— Heidegger never never never says that we should only focus on “Bezugssinn” and “Vollzugssinn” because the “Gehaltssinn” (the content) is irrelevant. This is just a blatant misrepresentation of Heidegger.

But Blok says: “as we will show in the remainder of this section” — so let’s read that, and let’s hope for the best.

Blok says we must first come back “to the essentialism” of Heidegger’s philosophy. Blok seems to think that Heidegger says: “ontic phenomena do not affect ontological phenomena,” as if they are indeed separated. I do not know where Blok got that from. (sidenote: Blok also gets Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics wrong). Blok’s whole argument is Swiss cheese. If ontic phenomena do not affect ontological phenomena, then how is it decided what something is? the table, for example, as what it is, allows us to use it as a “thing for putting things on.”

Blok’s whole separation of the ontic and the ontological did not make sense one second. It’s not Heidegger’s view. Nor is it Husserl’s view. If anyone ever defended this view, it must be Mr. Strawmann. (Perhaps an imaginary friend of Blok.)

Blok then (non-sequitur) concludes: “for this reason, he argues ‘The essence of technology is by no means anything technology'” (41). No, no, no. It is not for this reason that Heidegger writes that… It’s misleading to have a whole set of very strange peculiar arguments that you can find nowhere in the vast landscape of Heidegger-literature and then follow up with: “for this reason, Heidegger argues…” — even worse, Blok follows up with: “And yet, we can question whether this is true, whether ontic phenomena indeed have no ontological impact.” (41). What are we doing here? first misrepresent the view of a philosopher only then to attack it. Of course it is not true that ontic phenomena have no ontological impact… no one ever defended that position except for Mr. Blok himself, who now proceeds to attack himself, only to present the “outcome” as him overcoming Heidegger, Husserl, Ihde, and so on…

Blok presents his great insight with another example: “The shift in our [understanding] of time does not happen with the first invention of the mechanical block, but is founded by the invention, dissemination, and use of the mechanical clock …” (42)

Block continues: “In this regard, we can question Heidegger’s assumption that ontic phenomena do not affect ontological phenomena, and with this, we can question Heidegger’s essentialist concept of phenomenology and argue that phenomenology should not only take ontic phenomena – the invention of the mechanical clock – on the ontological phenomena – the impact of this invention on the [understanding] of time as linear and chronological.” (42) —

So many things are wrong here. This is not Heidegger’s assumption. Heidegger does not have an essentialist concept of phenomenology. – and also, back to Blok’s example, compare it what Heidegger says in GA 27 about the use of a radio, that the existence of radios in an ever increasing numbers of living rooms does not only “challenge” us and puts us in a situation where we have to choose between a number of different radio programs, but also that by its mere existence all of us are now challenged to choose between having a radio, not having a radio, turning the radio on, turning it off. The existence of radios (ontic phenomena) clearly affects how we dwell in this world (ontological structures). Heidegger explains so in a manner that is much more convincing, has much more depth, and is much clearer than what Blok does… It has more depth since Heidegger reflects the transcendental constitution as well as the historicity of the constitution.

Also compare perhaps the uncountable passages where Heidegger writes about how modern science affects and changes how humans understand reality. Isn’t that also an existing ontic phenomenon (modern science) that affects how we think about the world, about ourselves, about truth, about knowledge, etc?

What about what Heidegger says about technology. Mr. Blok says that this is one of his areas of research, so at least here Mr. Blok should be familiar with what Heidegger says. Heidegger talks about bombs, about power plants, about television, and even about computers, information-technologies, cybernetics, biotechnologies… and he suggests that saying “no” to these technologies and simply not using them does not solve anything. In all these examples, Heidegger shows in detail how they affect our understanding of the world.

Btw. I can also vaguely remember Heidegger himself talking about how the use of clocks changes and affects our perception of time (in Being and Time, perhaps?). It is by no means an original example, nor an original point by Blok. Blok does not need to question anything that he first invented. He just needs to read Heidegger more carefully. (But then again, it is really hard to successfully acquire funding and land a good position at an university without claiming to be super original, initiative, interdisciplinary, criticizing big philosophers, overcoming their one-sidedness, innovating phenomenology, being ecological, and solving all problems with ease.)

What a wonderful proposal! Integration! Yes! “Ecological hermeneutic phenomenology”, yes! Great! Where do I sign?

Blok then continues with banalities about looking at the clock is important for us because if we look at the clock we know when the train arrives. If this is Blok’s example for how clocks impact our lives, and impacts “Being” and “thinking”, then…

It turns out: yes, this is Blok’s example for how ontic phenomena have an ontological impact. If we would dissect this example in more detail, we would see that even the example falls apart, because Blok overlooks what Heidegger says about our ordinary vulgar understanding of time, as if before the invention of mechanical clocks, people did not possess a linear understanding of time… but well… it’s just an example. The overall misunderstanding of Heidegger and the strawmanning of everything are the bigger problems.

Blok even says: because of what we can see with this example, we can now criticitze “Heidegger’s one-sided orientation on ontological phenomena” (44). … Again, there is no one-sided orientation on … in Heidegger’s philosophy. No Essentialism either.

Now Blok seems to modify is starting argument about Heidegger’s essentialism. On p. 44 he says: “essentialist bias of Heidegger’s phenomenology *in which ontic phenomena only function as a point of departure for considering ontological phenomena*.” Remember, in the beginning the main critique was: Heidegger begins with Being – not with beings. Now Blok modified the statement: Heidegger allegedly begins with beings, but THEN only talks about Being. Even this modified critique is wrong. Heidegger clarifies the relationship between ontology and anthropology / humanism in many many lectures and published texts, for instance, in the well-known “Letter on Humanism.” How could Heidegger say that the question of Being is in itself already “original ethics,” if thinking about Being leads away from beings, into the nomansland of a freefloating essences? — Blok does not worry about that.

Instead, he uses all of that strawmanning to present his breathtaking solution: “we propose a concept of an empirically informed ecological hermeneutic phenomenology as a method for researching both ontic and ontological phenomena in an integrated manner.” Wonderful.

As if phenomenology (Husserl/Heidegger) is not “empirically informed,” as if phenomenology does not reflect the correlation between constitution and constituted beings, as if Heidegger’s ontology is not concerned about beings… all of that is so wrong.

Btw. Blok has not explained yet what he means by “ecological”. But before he does so, he adds another keyword: “transductive” (44). Let’s see why.

Okay, so Blok says, he does not proceed “inductively or deductively, but sideways, laterally, by passing by, or transductively, leading through or across ontological phenomena by letting the thematic phenomena become nonthematic and thematizing … ontological phenomena” (44-45) —such a genius solution to all of the phenomenological problems: just thematize what is nonthematized, but do not do it inductively or deductively – just try it sideways! A wonderful explanation of the phenomenological method! Who needs different epochés, different reductions, who needs the eidetic intuition, different concepts of evidence, truth, who needs the formal indication, the hermeneutical diiudication, who needs the ontological genealogy, who needs the transcendental objectification of Being, who needs the concept of explicitly transcending, who needs any of the stuff the late Heidegger does — no one! Just try it sideways, transductively! Just do it.

Needless to say that using that new word “transductive” does not solve any issues. Needless to say that phenomenology did not proceed inductively or deductively. Needless to say that “just thematize the nonthematic” is not an explanation of a method. All of this is a gross simplification and also, if I may say so, indicates some sort of disrespect towards the existing literature on the phenomenological method.

4. The Rehabilitation of the Content Sense in Phenomenology

Blok thinks that it is necessary to “rehabilitate” the content sense. He only ever claimed that this content sense is not important to Husserl or Heidegger. He hasn’t proven it.

How does he rehabilitate something that does not need rehabilitation? First of all, he argues that there is some sort of materiality (of technological devices) that are not correlated to transcendental subjectivity (46).

Blok says: “the materiality of ontic phenomena like mechanical clocks res-cends (from res-, matter, thing), rather than trans-cends, our living and acting in the World …” (46) Blok seems to call this materiality that we cannot experience directly its ecological condition, and aims at another critique of Husserl who allegedly neglects this kind of materiality. Blok wants to engage in a “res-cendental transduction to get access to the phenomenon of phenomenology.” (46) – he therefore wants to reject Husserl’s epoché.

This whole idea is also a little bit weird. It seems to be inspired by and informed by French Phenomenologists; but the decision to call it res-cendental is perhaps not the best, since “res” is taken from a tradition in which this kind of materiality has no place. But that’s just a terminological issue. The bigger problem concerns the claim that one can make sense of this materiality without taking into account how it is constituted within consciousness. How can something that is not constituted by conciousness be experienced, seen, thought?

Blok rightfully insists here on a tension within transcendental phenomenology which concerns the status of what is alien to consciousness, nature, the other, and so on. I’d argue that this is what drove Heidegger towards the metontology in 1928, and later to the concept of “Earth” in the 1930s. But I am not sure that what Blok has in mind with “the Earth as the source of scarce materials”, “the environment in whcih factories are established,” and “the earth as a dumping ground for waste materials” carry the same meaning as that of “nature” within these sophisticated accounts of transcendental phenomenology.

I suspect that Blok misunderstands both the constitution and the epoché, because he seems to think that only what we directly experience is constituted and can therefore be reflected and analyzed within the epoché, while these “ecological conditions” he has in mind and which are not “directly experienced” allegedly are not constituted by the subject.

It is hard to pinpoint where exactly Blok runs off the track, but something is odd with his interpretation. No phenomenologist would ever deny that things like a mechanical clock have been produced out of some materials, in a factory, by some factory workers… There are still ecological constraints on what can be produced, there are laws of nature, there are historical conditions of what can and will be produced, and so forth. The phenomenologist, when he wants to find out what it means for something to be produced (such as Heidegger did in his analyses of tools and the ready-to-hand) will take these processes into account. But again, these ecological conditions – what Blok calls the “materiality” and what he beautifully describes as a “res-cendental transduction” – is not the same as what Heidegger called facticity, nature, or the Earth or what Husserl talked about with his concept of “lifeworld.”

Why is Blok talking about that? All of this leads to what Blok calls a “terrestrial turn” that considers the planetary context in which technologies emerge and function (48). Blok wants more “social engagement and ecological involvement”. Who doesn’t?! Great plan! Where do I sign?

5. Conclusion

The conclusion is a summary of all these brilliant ideas and insights and solutions that Blok developed in the previous sections. We could only repeat the many issues with Blok’s readings and interpretations. There are a few new problems, for example when Blok explains the relational sense of something as its Being, and its enactment sense as thinking (49). — but the more general problem is the strawmanning and gross simplification and at times misrepresentation of phenomenology.

What is “sold” here are pseudo-solutions to problems Blok himself has invented. No real issues are addressed, no real problems are solved.

Blok’s method sounds nice: “res-cendental transduction”; and the “terrestrial turn” or the acknowledgment of the thing’s materiality… all of that sounds nice… but is not “sound” at all.

Blok is simplifying or neglecting issues. For example, his method of transduction instead of deduction or induction… “simply thematize what is nonthematized”… nothing is explained here. Blok is just throwing words at us.

Then, Blok’s example for how “ontic phenomena” are affecting ontological structures are completely trivial. The mechanical clock example is not convincing. Of course all phenomenologists would also say that there is a correlation between the ontic and ontological. Blok tries to convince us that Husserl/Heidegger were too shallow to see that; — but the actual correlation is explained much much better in Husserl and Heidegger. Everything that Blok tries to sell to us with fancy words that would work wonderfully in applications for funding, is worked out in much greater detail and depth by these phenomenologists.

Blok’s critique of Husserl’s epoché is not convincing. Blok did not prove that it is wrong to say that we can learn about something by analyzing its constitution in the epoché. Blok just said that there are things that are not directly experienced which we therefore cannot reduce to transcendental subjectivity. But phenomenologists would definitely account for things that are not directly experienced within the constitution. “History” for example, is something that is not directly experienced and is not present when we look at the mechanical clock, and yet, phenomenologists account for how history is shaping the constitution of things.

What else? Ah well, the overall strawmanning of phenomenology is appalling. Why is Heidegger an essentialist? When did Heidegger say we must neglect the content sense? Where did Heidegger argue that Being has nothing to do with beings? — all of that is so wrong… and to be honest… I really wonder how articles like that get through peer review and then actually get published.

(First, I was in shock because I thought the wonderful Karen de Boer was one of the publishers. But it was a different de Boer, namely Bas de Boer.)

One last thing. Perhaps a personal petpeeve of mine. But if you look at Blok’s article and pay attention to the books and articles he mentions, — he is mostly quoting himself. I think he quoted himself 10 times in these 20 pages. I mean… maybe that makes sense and maybe it is not really a problem. But if we also consider how little attention Blok paid to the literature… one could only come to the conclusion that Blok should perhaps pay more attention to texts that he has not written himself.

Let us read: #MoreHeidegger #LessVincentBlok