Regarding the matter of Philosophy: Whether Philosophy is an inquiry into “being” or a “scienceo f consciousness”. Regarding method, the dispute concerns a nuance in the concept of phenomenological reduction. (54)
1: The Matter of Philosophy
“We understand being and yet we lack the concept,” Husserl responds in the margin: “We lack it? When would we need it?” (Husserl 1997: 465).” (54)
Up to page 7: Historical Overview of their Relationship. Regarding the content, their parting of ways is indicated as concerning the facticity of consciousness (transcendental conciousness vs. Dasein).
Heidegger’s own position as a response to what he sees as Husserl’s residual individualism, rationalism (theory), and internalism. (cf. 55):
1. Heidegger conceives individuation not as prior to the social but as a modification of it. (56) “One philosophically significant consequence is that the
understanding of being that makes ontological inquiry possible is not first of all a
matter of what takes place in an individual mind but is, rather, an intelligibility that
resides in the shared social practices prevalent in a particular culture at a particular
historical moment.”
2. husserl reads practical engagements “back into pre-theoretical experience”.
3. Representationalism: “Heidegger finds that Husserl’s talk of the “constitution” of the thing by means of a “synthesis” of various intentional acts remains caught in the Cartesian trap.” (58) —
Is it Husserl’s claim that “nothing essential to the constiution of meaning lies outside transc. consciousness”? (58) (internalism)
Part II: The Method of Philosophy
continue here tomorrow